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THE UNITED NATIONS AS VIEWED
FROM GENEVA*
WILLIAM E. RAPPARD
Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, Switzerland
The United Nations Organization is an essentially American product,
as the jeep or the atomic bomb. Conceived at Dumbarton Oaks near the
American Capitol, inspired by American ideas, born under American
chairmanship on the American West Coast, having decided on a perma-
nent site in America, it is even endowed with an American surname. In
fact as in word, there would be no United Nations were there not a
United States.
It is therefore very generous of an American body to ask me, as a foreign
visitor to your shores, what I think of this American product. But it is
correspondingly embarrassing for me to attempt to tell you. When one
is invited out to dinner, it hardly does to comment, except in terms of
the highest enthusiasm, on the cuisine of your host or on the beauty of
his daughter.
Your invitation to this intellectual feast therefore obliges me to choose
between politeness and sincerity. As I am speaking here at your request,
not in any diplomatic capacity whatever, but solely as a friend among
friends and as one man of science to a host of academic colleagues, known
and unknown, I unhesitatingly opt in favor of complete frankness. I
venture to trust that our common ideals of scientific freedom will assure
my impunity from any reproach of indiscretion or of impertinence.
Before describing the international view as seen from Geneva, may I
be allowed briefly to define the point from which it is observed. Geneva
is, first, a city in the heart of Europe. It is, second, a city in small and
traditionally neutral Switzerland. It is, finally, the seat of the League of
Nations. The new organization is therefore to be judged from the point
of view of the old and of a neutral European country.
Now Europe is a small but very densely populated continent. Long the
hotbed of international conflict, it was the birthplace of the two successive
world wars which are the real parents of the two successive organizations
for the maintenance of peace.
Europe is densely populated not only by individual human beings, but
also by so-called sovereign states. Without burdening this paper with any
* An address delivered at the forty-first annual meeting of the American Political
Science Association, Philadelphia, March 28, 1946.
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546 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW
demographic statistics, I will venture to call attention only to two out-
standing facts, which seem particularly relevant to our present discussion.
The first is that, of the eight Great Powers existing on the eve of the
First World War, six were European. Of these six European Great Powers,
only three—Great Britain, France, and Italy—emerged victorious from
the First World War; but all of them, except dismembered Austria-
Hungary, maintained or shortly regained their status as Great Powers in
the inter-war period.
Today there are nominally only five Great Powers left in the world,
and only three in Europe. In fact, however, there remain only two or at
most, three, states which are in a position to exercise any decisive in-
fluence over the destinies of mankind. And of these two or three truly
Great Powers, one is American, another is half-Asiatic, and the third is
essentially maritime and therefore foreign to the continent of Europe.
Europe is therefore, for the first time since the origins of the history of
civilization, deprived not only of the world domination she has long
exercised abroad, but even of a truly European leadership at home. The
former master has become the servant of the outside world. Such is the
price he has paid for the criminal folly of the two world wars, of which he
was both the principal author and the chief victim.
The same, most significant fact is reflected in the composition and, of
course, also in the seat of the new world organization. Of the twenty-eight
sovereign states which constituted the political population of Europe on
the outbreak of the Second World War, three have forfeited even their
nominal independence, nearly ten others have at least temporarily for-
feited their real independence, and twelve, that is, about half of the total,
are not as yet members of the United Nations. To view the United Na-
tions from Geneva is therefore to see them from a continent which has so
little influence over the new organization that it in fact feels almost foreign
to it.
This is particularly true of Switzerland, which had been especially inti-
mate with the League of Nations. This intimacy was due to geographical
propinquity, and also to the referendum which, in 1920, preceded Switzer-
land's adherence to the Covenant. Thanks to the long campaign which
preceded the vote, her population had probably become more familiar
with that document than had any other nation.
At present, Switzerland is indeed doubly foreign to the United Nations.
She is foreign, first, because, as all other states which were not drawn into
the late war, she is not yet welcome to the circle of the self-styled "peace-
loving" belligerents who created and who alone compose the new organi-
zation. But she is foreign to the United Nations also because her people,
having been independent for over 600 and neutral for the last 400 years,
are more attached to their independent neutrality than ever before, and
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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 547
because the Charter of San Francisco was deliberately framed so as to
exclude independent neutrals from the ranks of its signatories and ad-
herents.
As for Geneva itself, it is not only a European and a Swiss town. It
has long been and still is the seat of many international organizations.
Of these, the League of Nations and the International Labor Organization
were, of course, by far the most important. While feeling somewhat alien
to the United Nations as European and as Swiss, Geneva is therefore
particularly interested in the new organization as the closest witness of
the activities of the old. The attitude of Geneva toward the United Na-
tions is thus perhaps not quite identical with that of the rest of Switzer-
land. Apart from considerations of economic interest, which may play
their part in shaping public opinion, the city of Calvin and Rousseau is,
for ideal and sentimental reasons also, probably sadder than the rest of
the country over the turn of events which has led to what might be called
the de-Europeanization or Americanization of the organization of peace.
These introductory remarks should suffice to explain why, when espied
from the European, Swiss, and local observation point of Geneva, the
United Nations nymph appears less glamorously attractive than she did
to her closer admirers on the sunlit beaches of California where she was
born, or than she does now that she is more tediously engaged in going
to school in New York and in house-hunting in the apparently not all too
hospitable vicinity.
But if the point of view of Geneva is undoubtedly critical, it is not in
the least unsympathetic; still less is it envious. We Europeans, Swiss, and
Genevese would be truly unforgivable if, fully conscious as we are both
of the terrible difficulties and of the supreme importance of the task as-
sumed by the men of Dumbarton Oaks, of San Francisco, of London, and
of New York, we should fail to bid them Godspeed and to offer them what-
ever little assistance our enfeebled resources allow us still to render the
common cause of international peace and good-will.
II
It is, of course, out of the question here to subject the 111 articles of
the Charter to a critical analysis and point by point to compare them with
the corresponding provisions of the Covenant. Rather would I like to call
attention to what strikes me as the all-important origin of the new or-
ganization and to indicate the chief traits which, as I see it, are the logical
and indeed almost inevitable consequences of that origin.
The United Nations Organization was born of and during a great war.
The founders of the organization were both the initial, pacific victims of,
and the final, complete victors over, the bellicose foes whose wanton ag-
gression had obliged them to fight in self-defense. The war itself had
ht
tp
s:
//
do
i.o
rg
/1
0.
23
07
/1
94
93
28
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fr
om
 h
tt
ps
:/
w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e.
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f B
as
el
 L
ib
ra
ry
, o
n 
10
 Ju
l 2
01
7 
at
 1
5:
00
:2
2,
 s
ub
je
ct
 to
 th
e 
C
am
br
id
ge
 C
or
e 
te
rm
s 
of
 u
se
, a
va
ila
bl
e 
at
 h
tt
ps
:/
w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e/
te
rm
s.
548 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW
broken out after the collapse of the League of Nations, set up a quarter
of a century ago for the maintenance of peace. Such, in my eyes, are the
fundamental facts which explain the characteristics of the new organiza-
tion.
Now what are these characteristics? Let me stress but three of them.
The first is the composition of the United Nations. Born of and during the
war, this composition was naturally limited to the victorious Allies. How
indeed could it have been otherwise? Neither the as yet undefeated ene-
mies, nor the unwelcome and unwilling neutrals, could have assumed the
dignity and the name of the United Nations. United in war, these nations
intended to remain united in the peace which they felt bound to impose
on belligerents and neutrals alike. What the Allied and Associated states
had been in the first world war, the United Nations were in the second.
But whereas the Allied and Associated states in 1919, on the morrow of
the armistice, felt impelled to create a pacific League or better, Society
of Nations, the United Nations in 1945, on the eve of the armistice, de-
cided to remain united to protect themselves and, only quite incidentally,
the rest of the world against any possible new aggression.
The second consequence of the belligerent origin of the United Nations
Organization is, in my eyes, its hierarchic structure, its authoritarian
spirit, and the unpacified and militant character of the most significant
provisions of its Charter. In war there is and there can be no equality of
nations. The powerful command and the weak obey. The position of
belligerent allies on a battlefield is comparable to that of the crew and
passengers on a shipwrecked vessel. The vigorous, if they are generous, do
what they can to save their feebler fellow-victims, but, if they are intel-
ligent, they neither heed the protests of the latter nor do they seek nor
take their advice.
That is why the San Francisco Charter, drafted as it was by belligerent
allies before the end of hostilities, much as it speaks of the "sovereign
equality of states," violates that principle to a degree unknown in all
previous annals of international law. It not only distributes influence ac-
cording to importance, as does the United States Constitution, for in-
stance, by granting to New York more representatives in Congress than
to Nevada, and as did the Covenant of the League of Nations by recog-
nizing the privileged position of the permanent members of the Council.
But, what is much more debatable, the Charter further creates two dis-
tinct sets of rights and duties. It, in fact, places the five Great Powers
above the law laid down for the others, a procedure for which there is,
to my knowledge, neither precedent in the law of nations, nor analogy in
any liberal national constitution. Not only is the international aristocracy
of the powerful recognized as such in the Charter and endowed with al-
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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 549
most unlimited authority over the underprivileged masses, but its indi-
vidual members are assured of almost unlimited impunity in case of
violation of their pacific covenants. It is indeed open to serious speculation
whether any but the five great members of the United Nations can still
be held to be free nations, inasmuch as all the others have surrendered
the right of peace and war into the hands of a body on which all but six
of them enjoy no representation.
This is as much as admitted in the recently published, very useful com-
mentary on the Charter by Messrs. Goodrich and Hambro. Discussing
Article 24, they truly write: "This provision, taken in conjunction with
the provision of Article 25, results in the relinquishment by certain mem-
bers of the organization of a considerable amount of their freedom of
action, since they agree in advance to be represented by and to be bound
by the decisions of a body on which they are not necessarily represented
and over whose decisions they have no effective control. This is, of course,
not true of the permanent members of the Security Council."
The supreme authority of the Security Council is, to be sure, limited
by the absolute and unqualified sovereignty of its five permanent mem-
bers. It is therefore not cynicism, but only clearsightedness, to note that
the freedom of the under-privileged members of the United Nations is
conditioned by the disunity of their privileged masters.
It would appear, moreover, that in exchange for the vital rights of
sovereignty the small United Nations have surrendered into the hands
of the Security Council, they have received in return no real guarantees
of enhanced safety. To be sure, they are promised effective protection
against aggression, but only against such aggression as would neither be
willed, nor encouraged, nor at least tolerated, by any one of the five Great
Powers. Now, is it not obvious that the dangers so provided against are
as imaginary, or at least as unlikely, as are real and, alas! not too improb-
able those perils to which small states remain exposed by such aggressive
action as may be undertaken with impunity, not only by any one of the
Great Powers, but by any other state with the approval, or even without
the expressed and active disapproval, of any one of the Great Powers?
This further very characteristic weakness of the security system set up
under the San Francisco Charter would hardly be comprehensible were it
not for the belligerent origin of that strange document. Allied together in
a common struggle against a common foe, the United Nations were
obviously as ill-prepared to consider any danger other than that by which
they had been threatened and with which they were successfully dealing,
as they were ill-disposed to conceive of the treasonable possibility of any
armed conflict among themselves. But natural as are the relevant provi-
sions in a treaty of defensive alliance drafted in the course of a war, they
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550 THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW
would hardly seem sufficient to establish and to maintain security in an
enactment intended for the pacific organization of the international com-
munity as a whole.
That is why also the Charter, voluble as it is on the subject of collective
security and of international arbitration, is almost mute on that of general
disarmament. In 1919, such disarmament was looked upon both as the
price to be paid for, and still more as the great prize to be collected after,
the effective organization of peace. In 1945, such a goal was obviously
held to be too distant and too uncertain to justify any dangerously pre-
mature consideration of collective disarmament.
Viewed in the perspective of history, the reduction and limitation of
national armaments, even if it is not a condition of, is assuredly a most
faithful index to, international security. If that is so, then the San Fran-
cisco Charter, by its very discretion on that vexed issue, is evidence of the
lack of confidence felt by its authors in its protective virtues.
The last point on which the Charter of the United Nations would seem
to reflect its belligerent origins is that of its relation to the Covenant of
the League of Nations. The Charter was born of a war which the Covenant
had failed to prevent. Hence the distinctly, and often even aggressively,
critical attitude of its Californian drafters towards the work of their
Geneva predecessors. But as the Covenant was in fact the product and the
expression of much political wisdom, and as the experience gained by the
League was not lost upon its often well-informed but somewhat ungrate-
ful successors, they were led on many points to emulate and to imitate,
but were ever loath to copy, its provisions. Thus the Assembly of the
League became the General Assembly of the United Nations, the Council
of the League, the Security Council and the Social and Economic Council
of the United Nations, the old Permanent Court of International Justice,
the new International Court of Justice, and the discarded and discredited
Mandates System, the novel, much more ambitious but perhaps less
really promising International Trusteeship. Was it not, in part also, for
similar reasons that Geneva was spurned by those whom Westchester
county seems so uncertainly impatient to welcome?
There is nothing in these developments to surprise, still less to arouse the
indignation of, the philosophical student of human affairs. It would be
misleading, however, and therefore unfortunate and possibly even mis-
chievous for the future, if the idea got abroad that the League of Nations
had succumbed to the imperfection of its Covenant and that the United
Nations could be expected to thrive on the superiority of their Charter.
Would it not be far truer, and not really paradoxical, to say that, in so
far as the Covenant can be held responsible for the downfall of the League,
it was by reason of its virtues and not of its shortcomings? Had the
Covenant provided for the unrestricted freedom of action of the Great
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Powers, that is, in fact, for the impunity of all dangerous aggressors, it
would assuredly have been an inferior document. But had it been so,
President Wilson might have been spared the opposition of the Senate
and the United States, by joining the League, might have spared itself
and the rest of the world the horrors of the recent war.
One all-important fact should be stressed in conclusion: the inter-
national community, no less than the states which compose it, should be
judged on its policies much more than on its constitution. Now there is no
doubt that the League of Nations failed to live up to the standards of its
Covenant, whereas in its initial stages the United Nations rather seem
inclined to rise above those of their Charter. There lies the great hope of
the future.
As the late President Lawrence Lowell used to say, hypothetics, that is,
speculation as to what might have been, is an intellectual pastime as vain
as it is captivating. What is far more certain than conjectures about a
past that was not, is that today no international organization for the
maintenance of peace can hope to succeed without the active leadership
of the government, and without the eager support of the people, of the
United States of America. If in order to secure this American cooperation,
it was necessary to recognize the exclusive right of Great Power veto and
thereby to legalize the sovereign inequality of nations, then these sad
blemishes on the San Krancisco charter may still prove to have been
blessings in disguise. For peace can survive that right, if it be not exercised,
and that iniquity, if it be soon abolished. But what world peace could
not survive would be American isolationism, that is, indifference to the
fate of mankind on the part of the most powerful of the liberal, and of the
more liberal of the two most powerful, nations of the world.
Such, viewed from Geneva, is the mission, the responsibility, and the
unique privilege of this country. Such is the message which I venture to
bring from the oldest to the greatest of living democracies.
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